INTERFERENCE WITH FREEDOM
I. A person is guilty of a class B felony if such person knowingly takes from this state or entices away from this state any child under the age of 18, or causes any such child to be taken from this state or enticed away from this state, with the intent to detain or conceal such child from:
(a) A parent, guardian or other person having lawful parental rights and responsibilities as described in RSA 461-A
III. It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge under paragraph I or II that the person so charged was acting in good faith to protect the child from real and imminent physical danger. Evidence of good faith shall include but shall not be limited to the filing of a nonfrivolous petition documenting such danger and seeking to modify the custody decree in a court of competent jurisdiction within this state. Such petition must be filed within 72 hours of termination of visitation rights.
IV. The affirmative defense set forth in paragraph III shall not be available if the person charged with the offense has left this state with the child.
21-M:8-k Rights of Crime Victims. –
I. As used in this section:
(a) ” Victims ” means a person who suffers direct or threatened physical, emotional, psychological or financial harm as a result of the commission or the attempted commission of a crime. “Victim” also includes the immediate family of any victim who is a minor or who is incompetent, or the immediate family of a homicide victim, or the surviving partner in a civil union.
(b) ” Crime ” means a violation of a penal law of this state for which the offender, upon conviction, may be punished by imprisonment for more than one year or an offense expressly designated by law to be a felony; a misdemeanor sexual offense; an offense listed in RSA 173-B:1, I; a violation of a protective order under RSA 458:16, III; or after arraignment, a violation of a protective order issued under RSA 173-B.
II. To the extent that they can be reasonably guaranteed by the courts and by law enforcement and correctional authorities, and are not inconsistent with the constitutional or statutory rights of the accused, crime victims are entitled to the following rights:
(a) The right to be treated with fairness and respect for the victim’s safety, dignity, and privacy throughout the criminal justice process.
(b) The right to be informed about the criminal justice process and how it progresses.
(c) The right to be free from intimidation and to be reasonably protected from the accused throughout the criminal justice process, including the right to relocate for the victim’s safety.
(d) The right to reasonable and timely notice of all court proceedings, including post-conviction proceedings, and administrative proceedings including parole and probation.
(e) The right on the same basis as the accused to attend trial and all other court proceedings, including post-conviction proceedings.
(f) The right to confer with the prosecution and to be consulted about the disposition of the case, including plea bargaining.
(g) The right to have inconveniences associated with participation in the criminal justice process minimized.
(h) The right to be notified if presence in court is not required.
(i) The right to be informed about available resources, financial assistance, and social services.
(j) The right to full and timely restitution, as granted under RSA 651:62-67 or any other applicable state law, or victim’s compensation, under RSA 21-M:8-h or any other applicable state law, for their losses.
(k) The right to be provided a secure, but not necessarily separate, waiting area during court proceedings.
(l) The right to be advised of case progress and final disposition.
(m) The right of confidentiality of the victim’s address, place of employment, and other personal information.
(n) The right to the prompt return of property when no longer needed as evidence.
(o) The right to have input in the probation presentence report impact statement.
(p) The right to appear and be heard at any disposition and any proceeding involving the release, plea, sentencing, or parole of the accused, including the right to be notified of, to attend, and to make a written or oral impact statement at the sentence review hearings and sentence reduction hearings. No victim shall be subject to questioning by counsel when being heard.
(q) The right to be notified of an appeal, an explanation of the appeal process, the time, place and result of the appeal, and the right to attend the appeal hearing.
(r) The right to be notified of, to attend, and to make a written or oral victim impact statement at the sentence review hearings and sentence reduction hearings. No victim shall be subject to questioning by counsel when giving an impact statement.
(s) The right to be notified of any change of status such as prison release, permanent interstate transfer, or escape, and the date of the parole board hearing, when requested by the victim.
(t) The right to address or submit a written statement for consideration by the parole board on the defendant’s release and to be notified of the decision of the board, when requested by the victim.
(u) The right to all federal and state constitutional rights guaranteed to all victims of crime on an equal basis, and notwithstanding the provisions of any laws on capital punishment, the right not to be discriminated against or have their rights as a victim denied, diminished, expanded, or enhanced on the basis of the victim’s support for, opposition to, or neutrality on the death penalty.
(v) The right to access to restorative justice programs, including victim-initiated victim-offender dialogue programs offered through the department of corrections.
(w) The right to be informed of the filing of a petition for post-conviction DNA testing under RSA 651-D.
(x) The right to have the prosecuting attorney notify the victim’s employer, if requested by the victim, of the necessity of the victim’s cooperation and testimony in a court proceeding that may necessitate the absence of the victim from work for good cause.
II-a. (a) In any case where the victim informs the court that he or she requires assistance in making an oral or written impact statement permitted under this section, the court shall allow the victim to designate a representative to write or speak on the victim’s behalf.
(b) The victim’s impact statement shall not be limited to the injuries, harm, or damages noted in the information or indictment, but may include all injuries, harm, and damages suffered as a result of the commission or attempted commission of the crime whether or not the injuries, harm, or damages were fully determined or discovered at the time the information or indictment was filed.
Source. 1991, 39:2. 1993, 356:2. 2003, 259:1. 2007, 225:1, 2. 2009, 283:4, 6; 312:1. 2010, 299:4, eff. Sept. 11, 2010. 2020, 24:6, eff. Sept. 18, 2020.
21-M:8-b Office of Victim/Witness Assistance. –
(b) Provide victims or their representatives with information about how to contact the appropriate county office of victim/witness assistance and the appropriate state or county prosecutor’s office.
(c) Gather information from victim/witness assistance programs throughout the country and make that information available to county offices of victim/witness assistance, police departments, hospitals, prosecutor’s offices, the courts, and other agencies that provide assistance to victims of crime.
(e) Provide victims or their representatives with information about the availability of and access to restorative justice programs including victim-initiated victim-offender dialogue programs offered through the department of corrections.
(b) In the case of a child victim, the claimant, guardian ad litem, advocate or parent may claim compensation in the victim’s stead. (c) A family member of a law enforcement officer, an inmate at a state or county correctional facility, and an individual who is not a citizen of the United States or who is not a legal alien shall be considered victims eligible for compensation under this section.
II. The claimant, or parent may file a claim for compensation within 2 years of the crime, unless good cause is shown
III. A claimant shall not be deemed ineligible for compensation based solely upon failure to apprehend the offender, or based upon failure of the state to obtain a conviction against the offender, providing there is reasonable evidence to sustain the claim that a crime had been committed which resulted in injury to the victim.
IV. The commission may consider the finding of innocence or guilt of the alleged offender in arriving at their determination of eligibility of the claimant. In determining eligibility and the amount of compensation to be awarded, the commission shall consider the contributory fault of the victim in causing his injury. If compensation is paid to members of the accused’s immediate family, or persons who reside with or who have maintained a continuous relationship with the accused, the accused shall receive no benefit or enrichment as a result of payment of such compensation.
V. The claimant may be reimbursed for reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, medical expenses, funeral expenses, counseling expenses, rehabilitative expenses, expenses associated with the victim’s participation in post-conviction proceedings and victim-offender dialogue programs or other restorative justice programs, and lost wages directly resulting from the crime. There shall be a $50,000 maximum recovery per claimant per incident. If expenses paid through the victims’ assistance program fund are later covered by insurance settlements, civil suit settlements, or restitution, or through any other source, the claimant shall reimburse the fund for the amount of expenses recovered.
V-a. Notwithstanding any right by a victim to claim restitution or a court order for restitution under RSA 651:62-67, a victim shall be eligible for compensation under this section.
VI, VII. [Repealed.]
VIII. Any person who was a victim of a crime under investigation by the cold case homicide unit as established in RSA 21-M:8-m shall be eligible for victim’s compensation regardless of the date of the crime.
IX. Notwithstanding paragraph II, any person who was a victim of a crime for which the person convicted of the crime has filed a petition for post-conviction DNA testing under RSA 651-D shall be eligible for victim’s compensation regardless of the date of the crime. Compensation under this paragraph shall be limited to qualified expenses incurred after the post-conviction DNA testing petition is filed.
X. (a) No person that has received notice of a claim filed pursuant to this section shall collect a debt or attempt to collect a debt resulting from a crime-related expense against a claimant under this section until an award is made to the claimant or the claim is determined to be noncompensable. The statute of limitations for the collection of such debts shall be tolled during the period of this prohibition.
(b) Any person who violates the provisions of this paragraph shall be liable to the claimant pursuant to the provisions of RSA 358-C:4.
(c) In this paragraph, “person” shall have the same meaning as in RSA 358-C:1, X.
XI. With the approval of the fiscal committee of the general court and the governor and council, the attorney general may request additional funds to pay claims for compensation to victims pursuant to RSA 21-M:8-h, on the warrant of the governor, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.
- something neglected or left undone
apathy toward or neglect of duty
626:1 Requirement of a Voluntary Act. –
I. A person is not guilty of an offense unless his criminal liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the voluntary omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable.
II. Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession.
Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.
626:2 General Requirements of Culpability. –
I. A person is guilty of murder, a felony, or a misdemeanor only if he acts purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense. He may be guilty of a violation without regard to such culpability. When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for its commission, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such culpability shall apply to all the material elements, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.
II. The following are culpable mental states:
(a) “Purposely.” A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when his conscious object is to cause the result or engage in the conduct that comprises the element.
(b) “Knowingly.” A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance that is a material element of an offense when he is aware that his conduct is of such nature or that such circumstances exist.
(c) “Recklessly.” A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the circumstances known to him, its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the situation. A person who creates such a risk but is unaware thereof solely by reason of having voluntarily engaged in intoxication or hypnosis also acts recklessly with respect thereto.
(d) “Negligently.” A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he fails to become aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that his failure to become aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.
III. When the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element is also established if the person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices, the element is also established if the person acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices, the element is also established if a person acts purposely.
IV. A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if the person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears.
V. Neither knowledge nor recklessness nor negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence or meaning of the law defining the offense is an element of such offense, unless the law so provides.
Source. 1971, 518:1. 1973, 370:29, 30, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.
626:3 Effect of Ignorance or Mistake. –
I. A person is not relieved of criminal liability because he acts under a mistaken belief of fact unless:
(a) The mistake negatives the culpable mental state required for commission of the offense; or
(b) The statute defining the offense expressly provides that such mistake is a defense; or
(c) Such mistake supports a defense of justification as defined in RSA 627.
II. A person is not relieved of criminal liability because he acts under a mistaken belief that his conduct does not, as a matter of law, constitute an offense unless his belief is founded upon a statement of the law contained in a statute or other enactment, or an administrative order or grant of permission, or a judicial decision of a state or federal court, or a written interpretation of the law relating to the offense officially made by a public servant, agency or body legally empowered with authority to administer, enforce or interpret such law. The defendant must prove a defense arising under this subsection by a preponderance of evidence.
Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.
626:4 Intoxication. – Intoxication is not, as such, a defense. The defendant may, however, introduce evidence of intoxication whenever it is relevant to negate an element of the offense charged, and it shall be taken into consideration in determining whether such element has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.
626:5 Entrapment. – It is an affirmative defense that the actor committed the offense because he was induced or encouraged to do so by a law enforcement official or by a person acting in cooperation with a law enforcement official, for the purpose of obtaining evidence against him and when the methods used to obtain such evidence were such as to create a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. However, conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.
626:6 Consent. –
I. The consent of the victim to conduct constituting an offense is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the harm sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
II. When conduct constitutes an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to the conduct is a defense if the bodily harm is not serious; or the harm is a reasonably foreseeable hazard of lawful activity.
III. Consent is no defense if it is given by a person legally incompetent to authorize the conduct or by one who, by reason of immaturity, insanity, intoxication or use of drugs is unable and known by the actor to be unable to exercise a reasonable judgment as to the harm involved.
Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.
626:7 Defenses; Affirmative Defenses and Presumptions. –
I. When evidence is admitted on a matter declared by this code to be:
(a) A defense, the state must disprove such defense beyond a reasonable doubt; or
(b) An affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
II. When this code establishes a presumption with respect to any fact which is an element of an offense, it has the following consequences:
(a) When there is evidence of the facts which give rise to the presumption, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury, unless the court is satisfied that the evidence as a whole clearly negatives the presumed fact; and
(b) When the issue of the existence of the presumed fact is submitted to the jury, the court shall charge that while the presumed fact must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the law declares that the jury may regard the facts giving rise to the presumption as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact.
Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.
626:8 Criminal Liability for Conduct of Another. –
I. A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both.
II. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:
(a) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; or
(b) He is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by the law defining the offense; or
(c) He is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense.
III. A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if:
(a) With the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he solicits such other person in committing it, or aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or
(b) His conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity.
IV. Notwithstanding the requirement of a purpose as set forth in paragraph III(a), when causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. In other words, to establish accomplice liability under this section, it shall not be necessary that the accomplice act with a purpose to promote or facilitate the offense. An accomplice in conduct can be found criminally liable for causing a prohibited result, provided the result was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conduct and the accomplice acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently with respect to that result, as required for the commission of the offense.
V. A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.
VI. Unless otherwise provided, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if:
(a) He is the victim of that offense; or
(b) The offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or
(c) He terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense or gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense.
VII. An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted.
Source. 1971, 518:1. 2001, 216:1, eff. Jan. 1, 2002.
625:9 Classification of Crimes. –
I. The provisions of this section govern the classification of every offense, whether defined within this code or by any other statute.
II. Every offense is either a felony, misdemeanor or violation.
(a) Felonies and misdemeanors are crimes.
III. A felony is murder or a crime so designated by statute within or outside this code or a crime defined by statute outside of this code where the maximum penalty provided is imprisonment in excess of one year; provided, however, that a crime defined by statute outside of this code is a felony when committed by a corporation or an unincorporated association if the maximum fine therein provided is more than $200.
(a) Felonies other than murder are either class A felonies or class B felonies when committed by an individual. Felonies committed by a corporation or an unincorporated association are unclassified.
(1) Class A felonies are crimes so designated by statute within or outside this code and any crime defined by statute outside of this code for which the maximum penalty, exclusive of fine, is imprisonment in excess of 7 years.
(2) Class B felonies are crimes so designated by statute within or outside this code and any crime defined outside of this code for which the maximum penalty, exclusive of fine, is imprisonment in excess of one year but not in excess of 7 years.
IV. Misdemeanors are either class A misdemeanors or class B misdemeanors when committed by an individual. Misdemeanors committed by a corporation or an unincorporated association are unclassified.
(a) A class A misdemeanor is any crime so designated by statute within or outside this code and any crime defined outside of this code for which the maximum penalty, exclusive of fine, is imprisonment not in excess of one year.
(b) A class B misdemeanor is any crime so designated by statute within or outside this code and any crime defined outside of this code for which the maximum penalty does not include any term of imprisonment or any fine in excess of the maximum provided for a class B misdemeanor in RSA 651:2, IV(a).
(b) A violation does not constitute a crime and conviction of a violation shall not give rise to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of a criminal offense.
V. A violation is an offense so designated by statute within or outside this code and, except as provided in this paragraph, any offense defined outside of this code for which there is no other penalty provided other than a fine or fine and forfeiture or other civil penalty. In the case of a corporation or an unincorporated association, offenses defined outside of this code are violations if the amount of any such fine provided does not exceed $50.
VII. The state may change any offense designated or defined as a class A misdemeanor as defined by paragraph IV to a class B misdemeanor, so long as no element of the offense involves an act of violence or threat of violence. The term ” act of violence ” means attempting to cause or purposely or recklessly causing bodily injury or serious bodily injury with or without a deadly weapon; and the term ” threat of violence ” means placing or attempting to place another in fear of imminent bodily injury either by physical menace or by threats to commit a crime against the person of the other.
Violence is bodily injury. Violence is physical, not mental……………… not someone feeling sad, angry or disagreeing with what you said. This is especially important if they can’t justify their standpoint. 173b is unconstitutional, AND conflicts with the ENTIRE criminal code.
625:10 Burden of Proof. – No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is assumed.
Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.
629:1 Attempt. –
I. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, with a purpose that a crime be committed, he does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the crime.
II. As used in this section, “substantial step” means conduct that is strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.
III. (a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the actor voluntarily renounces his criminal purpose by abandoning his effort to commit the crime or otherwise preventing its commission under circumstances manifesting a complete withdrawal of his criminal purpose.
(b) A renunciation is not “voluntary” if it is substantially motivated by circumstances the defendant was not aware of at the inception of his conduct which increase the probability of his detection or which make more difficult the commission of the crime. Renunciation is not complete if the purpose is to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.
IV. The penalty for attempt is the same as that authorized for the crime that was attempted, except that in the case of attempt to commit murder the punishment shall be imprisonment for life or such other term as the court shall order.
Source. 1971, 518:1. 1979, 126:5. 1999, 158:3, eff. June 28, 1999.
629:2 Criminal Solicitation. –
I. A person is guilty of criminal solicitation if, with a purpose that another engage in conduct constituting a crime, he commands, solicits or requests such other person to engage in such conduct.
II. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this section that the actor renounced his criminal purpose by persuading the other not to engage in the criminal conduct or by otherwise preventing commission of the crime under circumstances manifesting a purpose that it not occur.
III. It is no defense to prosecution under this section that the person solicited would be immune from liability for engaging in the criminal conduct by virtue of irresponsibility, incapacity or exemption.
IV. The penalty for criminal solicitation is the same as that authorized for the crime that was solicited, except that in the case of solicitation of murder the punishment shall be imprisonment for a term of not more than 30 years.
Source. 1971, 518:1. 1999, 158:2, eff. June 28, 1999.
629:3 Conspiracy. –
I. A person is guilty of conspiracy if, with a purpose that a crime defined by statute be committed, he agrees with one or more persons to commit or cause the commission of such crime, and an overt act is committed by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.
II. For purposes of paragraph I, “one or more persons” includes, but is not limited to, persons who are immune from criminal liability by virtue of irresponsibility, incapacity or exemption.
III. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this statute that the actor renounces his criminal purpose by giving timely notice to a law enforcement official of the conspiracy and of the actor’s part in it, or by conduct designed to prevent commission of the crime agreed upon.
Crimes That Judges and Government Officials Commit
643:1 Official Oppression. – A public servant, as defined in RSA 640:2, II, is guilty of a misdemeanor if, with a purpose to benefit himself or another or to harm another, he knowingly commits an unauthorized act which purports to be an act of his office; or knowingly refrains from performing a duty imposed on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his office.
Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973.
641:1 Perjury. –
I. A person is guilty of a class B felony if in any official proceeding:
(a) He makes a false material statement under oath or affirmation, or swears or affirms the truth of a material statement previously made, and he does not believe the statement to be true; or
(b) He makes inconsistent material statements under oath or affirmation, both within the period of limitations, one of which is false and not believed by him to be true. In a prosecution under this section, it need not be alleged or proved which of the statements is false but only that one or the other was false and not believed by the defendant to be true.
II. “Official proceeding” means any proceeding before a legislative, judicial, administrative or other governmental body or official authorized by law to take evidence under oath or affirmation including a notary or other person taking evidence in connection with any such proceeding. “Material” means capable of affecting the course or outcome of the proceeding. A statement is not material if it is retracted in the course of the official proceeding in which it was made before it became manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed and before it substantially affected the proceeding. Whether a statement is material is a question of law to be determined by the court.
Source. 1971, 518:1, eff. Nov. 1, 1973