I’m suing a City and Lawyer. They hired lawyers from the top law firms in state, and obviously are filing motions to dismiss.
Here is the case law they cited for the motions to dismiss.
Defendant City of Manchester (Police), New Hampshire Case Law
“The standard of review in considering a motion to dismiss is whether the plaintiff’s allegations are reasonably susceptible of a construction that would permit recovery.” Beane v. Dana S. Beane & Co., P.C., 160 N.H. 708, 711 (2010) ;
(quoting Perez v. Pike Industries, 153 N.H. 158, 159 (2005))
“documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties … official public records … [or] documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint.” Id. (citing Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993)).
he Court need not, however, “assume the truth of statements in the pleadings that are merely conclusions of law.” Ojo v. Lorenzo, 164 N.H. 717, 721 (2013) (citing Morrissey v. Town of Lyme, 162 N.H. 777, 780 (2011))
“is the exact kind of discretionary stifling that immunity is designed to prevent” (citing Everitt v. Gen. Elec. Co., 156 N.H. 202, 218 (2007)
See Morancy v. Morancy, 134 N.H. 493, 497 (1991) (quoting Morency v. Plourde, 96 N.H. 344, 346 (1950)) (“It is well settled that a ‘defendant is entitled to be informed of the theory on which the plaintiffs are proceeding and the redress that they claim as a result of the defendant’s actions.’” ).
With respect to a duty to arrest, it remains the law that municipalities are not “guarantors of public peace, safety and welfare.” Doucette v. Town of Bristol, 138 N.H. 205, 210 (1994). C.f. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989) (failure to protect individual from private harm does not generally give rise to a due process claim).
this Court previously observed the decision to make an arrest is typically a discretionary function of police officer. See Everitt . Gen. Elec. Co., 156 N.H. 202 (2007) (!! Immunity!!)
Ojo, 164 N.H. at 721 (citing Morrissey, 162 N.H. at 780). See also Kyle v. Linden Care, LLC, 2020 DNH 58 at p.2 (“Although the complaint need not set forth detailed factual allegations, it must provide ‘more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully harmed-me accusation.’”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))
Dichiara v. Sanborn Regional School District, RSA 507-B as specifically enacted by the legislature in response to the Court’s earlier decision abrogating municipal immunity. Dichiara, 165 N.H. 694, 697 (2013) (citing Merrill v. Manchester, 114 N.H. 722 (1974)
The statute was “designed to limit municipal liability arising from tort suits.” Id. (quoting Cannata v. Town of Deerfield, 132 N.H. 235, 243 (1989)) the Court concluded, “we will not interpret RSA 507-B:2 as expanding municipal liability.” Id.
Rather, “RSA 507-B:2 provides an exception to RSA 507-B:5 only when there is a nexus between the injury and a governmental unit’s ownership, occupation, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle or premises.” Dichiara, 165 N.H. at 696-97 (emphasis added). See also L.B. v. G.T., 2023-0561 (N.H. Supreme Court April 11, 2025)
Defendant Attorney Heidi Ames Case Law
See, e.g., Ojo v. Lorenzo, 164 N.H. 717, 721 (2013) (“official public records” and “documents the authenticity of which are not disputed” may be considered at the motion to dismiss stage)
plaintiff was allowed leave to amend his complaint to correct its deficiencies ERG, Inc. v. Barnes, 137 N.H. 186, 189 (1993)
“sufficiently establish a basis upon which relief may be granted.” Richard v. Governor, 177 N.H. 11, 14 (2024).
“need not assume the truth of statements in the plaintiff’s pleadings…that are merely conclusions of law.” Sanguedolce v. Wolfe, 164 N.H. 644, 645 (2013)
“show[] that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in publishing a false and defamatory statement of fact about the plaintiff to a third party, assuming no valid privilege applies to the communication.” Thomas v. Telegraph Publ’g Co., 156 N.H. 314, 321 (2007) (citation and quotation omitted). “Embedded in this recitation is the requirement that the challenged statement be one ‘of fact.’” Automated Transactions, LLC v. Am. Bankers Ass’n, 172 N.H. 528, 532 (2019) (quoting Pierson v. Hubbard, 147 N.H. 760, 763 (2002))
Tessier v. Rockefeller, 162 N.H. 324, 337 (2011)(contractual relations); Singer Asset Fin. Co., LLC v. Wyner, 156 N.H. 468, 478 (2007)(advantageous business relationship)
Malicious prosecution requires that the underlying action be frivolous in the eyes of a reasonable litigant. See Paul v. Sherburne, 153 N.H. 747, 752 (2006)
New Hampshire recognizes the litigation privilege. See, e.g., Lath v. City of Manchester, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59612, at *5 (D.N.H. April 9, 2018) (quoting McGranahan v. Dahar, 119 N.H. 763, 765-67 (1979) (“the New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that the litigation privilege bars defamation claims arising from statements in civil proceedings.”)).
“the Supreme Court of New Hampshire views the privilege to extend to any civil claim arising from statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding.” Hugel v. Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, LLP, 175 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 1999) (diversity case); accord, e.g., Singleterry v. Shaheen, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91667, at *7 (D.N.H. March 7, 2025) (plaintiff’s allegations “against Attorney Shaheen [were] based entirely on the latter’s statements and arguments in court” so they could not form the basis for a defamation claim).
if true, show “state action.” See, e.g., HippoPress, LLC v. SMG, 150 N.H. 304, 308 (2003) (state constitution); Aboussa v. Keystone Mgmt. Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146718, at *4-5 (D.N.H. June 27, 2023) (discussing state action requirement for claimed violations of federal constitution).
“the public defender appointed to represent [a criminal defendant] is not a state actor who can be sued for an alleged violation of [the defendant’s] constitutional rights.” Barr v. Mara, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70369, at *2 (D.N.H. May 17, 2013) (citing Polk Cnty v. Dodson, 452 U.S. 312, 325 (U.S. 1981))
“personal injury” in the caption as one to negligent infliction of emotional distress. See generally Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 657 (1979) (discussing history of recovery for emotional distress claims in New Hampshire); see also Thorpe v. State, 133 N.H.
299, 303 (1990) (requiring plaintiff “prove physical manifestations of his distress” to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress) privileged communication. See Provencher v. Buzzell-Plourde, 142 N.H. 848, 855 (1998).
“‘A civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some purpose not in itself unlawful by unlawful means.’” Jay Edwards, Inc. v. Baker, 130 N.H. 41, 47 (1987). Mere “references to conspiracy and conspiratorial conflict” that are “unsupported by factual content” cannot survive a motion to dismiss.
New Hampshire courts have allowed verdicts to be set aside when a party to an action testifies falsely about a material issue. See, e.g. Rasquin v. Cohen, 92 N.H. 440, 442 (1943).
The plaintiff alleges Attorney Ames committed “fraud upon the court” when she “lied about Defendant being scared” while seeking a protective order against the plaintiff in 2022.
